TOPIC: 6.857

DATE: 2/25/15

FILE UNDER:

PAGE: L07.1

Admin:

MIT Bitcoin Expo March 7-8
Bitcoin Club every Wed 8pm in 8-205

Today:

E-cash & bitcoin

- Money – basics
- Electronic checks
- Signed coin ID
- Identities
- (Public) Ledgers
- Bitcoin

Project ideas:

- How to make bitcoin work in solar system (or galaxy)? [Distributed consensus with communication delays?]
- What if >1 party is using Eyal/Sirer strategy? (ref "Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable")
- Study bitcoin alternatives ("alt-coins") & improvements
- Study bitcoin scalability

6.857 Rivest

L22.1 4/27/11

Admin:
- Talks start Monday
- Zeldovich talks Wed 5/11 on stuxnet

Today: "Electronic Cash"
- Basics: Atoms/Bits, Tokens/Accounts
- Electronic checks
- Properties
- Double-spending
- Coins & Peppercoin 
- Anonymity

"Electronic Money"

- What properties **should** it have?
- " " **can** " " ?

Atoms vs Bits

- What can "**possessing value**" (money) mean?
- How can we **transfer value**?

Easy to answer if we use (gold) **atoms** to represent value:
- gold atoms are hard to make
- only one person at a time can "own" an atom

Things get complicated if we want to use **bits**:
- easy to generate bits
- **bits can be copied** ⇒ **double-spending** becomes a problem!

(Token-based) Possession-based vs Account-based methods

- In a **possession-based** method, owning the representation ≡ owning the value

- In an **account-based** method, there is usually some TTP who "maintains accounts" (e.g. a "bank"); → or ledger
  xactions cause value to be shifted from one acct to another.
- **Most "bit-based" methods are account-based.**

Simple example: Electronic checks

- Account-based: Bank has PK_B, SK_B
- User has PK_u, SK_u, cert on (U, PK_u) by bank
- Check = [cert (on PK_u, signed by SK_B) ; sign(SK_u, "Pay Bob $100, date, serial #")]
- Bank deposits check just once (using ser #)
- Usual problem of overdrawn acct (bad check)
- Bank knows xact details: payer, payee, amt, date
- Merchant " " "

This works.

What else is possible?

Can we make payments more like cash?

Desirable (?) Properties

- Non-forgeable (prevent fraud, inflation)
- Not double-spendable
- Reliability: can "back up" your $
- Exclusive ownership
- Transferability: A can pay B
- Transitivity: B can use A's payment to pay C
- Variable-denominations
- Divisibility & combinability
- Efficiency (esp. for small amts)
- On-line versus off-line transactions
- Scalability
- anonymity
- security
- Conversion to "ordinary" money

traditional:
- medium of exchange
- store of value
- unit of account "unit of measure"

Double-spending

- essentially a "replay attack"
- if you can backup your $, then "restore" gives you your spent money back!?
- prevention seems really tough (unless you use atoms)
- detection requires convergence of spending records (e.g. at bank) and large databases (?) ledger
- even if you can detect double-spending – what do you do?
  - roll back / deny transaction (2nd merchant to get same electronic coin can't deposit it)
  - punishing perpetrator may be impossible if we have (true) anonymity: payer is not identifiable
  - furthermore: is payer or payee the culprit? (can merchant "frame" consumer?)
  - deterrence may be hard... how to punish (pay fine from account?)

Some approaches:

Signed coin ID

- Bank (TTP)
- Alice (payer)
- Bob (payee)



3 protocols to support:

1. withdrawal / authorization
   Alice becomes "able to pay"
   (e.g. cert issuance in check scheme)
2. payment
3. deposit

} life of a "coin"

1. withdrawal:
   - Bank gives Alice $\underbrace{R, \text{sign}(SK_B, R)}_{\text{= coin}}$ ← unforgeable object!
     R is coin ID
   - Bank keeps R in database of unspent coins
   - Bank debits Alice's acct for withdrawal
2. payment:
   Alice gives coin to Bob; Bob checks Bank sig
3. deposit:
   Bob gives coin to Bank, Bank checks sig & R in DB
   flags R as "spent"

- Not very efficient – bank has to sign each coin!
- Double-spending can be a problem!
- Check scheme better – merchant can't frame user!

Peppercoin (Micali & Rivest)

- "probabilistic payments":

  paying 10 ¢ (micropayment) ≅ paying $10 with probability 1/100 (macropayment, sometimes)

- based on electronic checks method
- Alice pays Bob 10 ¢ as follows:

  She gives Bob electronic check for $10 that contains condition: "This check valid if and only if E is true" (where E holds with probability 1/100)

- Bob must be able to test if E is true
  - if so, he can deposit check
  - if not, he throws check away (but gives Alice her purchase)
  - he gets paid correctly on the average (law of large numbers)
- Alice should not be able to tell if E is true when she writes check (else she can filter checks...)
- Bank should be able to tell if E is true (so "bad checks" where E is false, don't get deposited.

Bitcoin:

- ID's are PK's (used for signing transactions) ECDSA
- public ledger records all transactions (account-based) PK ≡ acct name
- money created by/for those maintaining ledger ("miners")
  no other way to create money

  (digress: discuss need for loans!)
- transaction detail:
  - from accts: —, —,
  - to accts: —, —
  - time

  (& amts) — valid if from accts have enough value
- ledger detail: "block chain"



block valid if hash(block) begins with enough zeros & Tx's valid

no TTP!

need to search nonces to find one that works (like hash cash)
solved blocks are "published"
longest chain wins

difficulty level adapts to
yield ≈ one solution every 10 minutes

wait for enough (6) confirmations

view blockchain.info

ledger is transaction log

implies account balances

verifying a transaction involves checking account balances

Issues:

- Scalability?
  - can it do e.g. 4000 tps (like Visa?)
  - blocks may reach 1/2 GB, block now is only 30GB or so
  - ECDSA signature verification main computational need
- Phasing out of miner's fee?
  (in 2140 or so ... 21M BTC) (reward halves every 4 years)
  xact fees
  25 BTC/block now
- Acct-based but no loans!

  (Can't create money by giving a loan, as you can with current monetary system.)

  Like "gold standard" in terms of "coin creation"
- Protocol vulnerabilities:
  - large pool of miners (>50%)
  - "majority is not enough" (Eyal/Sirer)