

Admin:

Pset #1 due 2/24. Pset #2 out 2/24. (new groups for pset #2)

Project idea:

AEG - Automate Exploit Generation CACM 2/14 p. 74-84

Discuss:

(The Tech) Tidbit students / letter / MIT legal aid.
2/18/14

Today:

Cryptographic hash functions

- definitions
- random oracle model
- desirable properties
- applications
- Keccak (SHA-3) overview

(Cryptographic) Hash functions

A cryptographic hash function h maps bit-strings of arbitrary length to a fixed-length output in an efficient, deterministic, public, "random" manner:

$$h: \underbrace{\{0,1\}^*}_{\text{all strings (of any length } \geq 0)} \longrightarrow \underbrace{\{0,1\}^d}_{\text{all strings of length } d}$$

Sometimes called a "message digest" function.

Typical output lengths are $d = 128, 160, 256, 512$ bits.

No secret key. Anyone can compute h from its public description. Computation is efficient (poly-time).


<u>Examples:</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>note</u>
MD4	128	} "broken" } w/ CR
MD5	128	
SHA-1	160	? CR?
SHA-256	256	
SHA-512	512	
SHA-3 (coming!)	224, 256, 384, 512	

"Ideal" Hash Function: Random Oracle (RO)

- Theoretical model - not achievable in practice

Oracle ("in the sky")

- receives inputs x & returns output $h(x)$, for any $x \in \{0,1\}^*$. $|h(x)| = d$ bits.
- On input $x \in \{0,1\}^*$:
 - if x not in book:
 - flip coin d times to determine $h(x)$
 - record $(x, h(x))$ in book
 - else: return y where (x, y) in book.
- Gives random answer every time, but uses book to record previous answers, so h is deterministic.



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
L8.9

Many cryptographic schemes are proved secure in ROM ("Random Oracle Model"), which assumes existence of RO. Then RO is replaced by conventional hash function (e.g. SHA-256) in practice, which is hopefully "pseudorandom enough" (!?)

OW

Hash function desirable properties:① "One-way" (pre-image resistance)

"Infeasible", given $y \in_R \{0,1\}^d$ to find
any x s.t. $h(x) = y$ (x is a "pre-image" of y)




$$h: \{0,1\}^+ \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^d$$

(Note that a "brute-force" approach of trying
 x 's at random requires $\Theta(2^d)$ trials (in ROM).)

CR

② "Collision-resistance" (strong collision resistance)

"Infeasible" to find x, x' s.t. $x \neq x'$ and
 $h(x) = h(x')$ (a "collision")



(In ROM, requires trying about $2^{d/2}$ x 's
 (x_1, x_2, \dots) before a pair x_i, x_j colliding is
 found. (This is the "birthday paradox".))

Actually, the correct definition is that is hard for an adversary, given $y = h(x)$ (where x was picked uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^n$) to find any x' such that $h(x') = y$.

Note that collisions are unavoidable since

$$|\{0,1\}^*| = \infty$$

$$|\{0,1\}^d| = 2^d$$

Birthday paradox detail:

If we hash x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n (distinct strings)

then

$$\begin{aligned} E(\# \text{ collisions}) &= \sum_{i \neq j} \Pr(h(x_i) = h(x_j)) \\ &= \binom{n}{2} \cdot 2^{-d} \quad [\text{if } h \text{ "uniform"}] \\ &\approx \frac{n^2 \cdot 2^{-d}}{2} \end{aligned}$$

This is ≥ 1 when $n \geq 2^{(d+1)/2} \approx 2^{d/2}$

The birthday paradox is the reason why hash function outputs are generally twice as big as you might naively expect; you only get 80 bits of security (w.r.t. CR) for a 160-bit output.

With some tricks, memory requirements can be dramatically reduced.

TCR

③ "Weak collision resistance" (target collision resistance, 2nd pre-image resistance)

"Infeasible", given $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, to find $x' \neq x$
s.t. $h(x) = h(x')$.

Like CR, but one pre-image given & fixed.

(In ROM, can find x' in time $\Theta(2^d)$
(as for OW, since knowing x doesn't help in ROM to find x').

PRF

④ "Pseudo-randomness

" h is indistinguishable under black-box access
from a random oracle"

(To make this notion workable, really need a
family of hash functions, one of which is chosen
at random. A single, fixed, public hash function
is easy to identify...

NM

⑤ "Non-malleability

"Infeasible", given $h(x)$, to produce
 $h(x')$ where x and x' are "related"
(e.g. $x' = x + 1$).

These are informal definitions...

Theorem: If h is CR, then h is TCR.
(But converse doesn't hold.)

Theorem: h is OW $\not\leftrightarrow$ h is CR
(neither implication holds)
But if h "compresses", then $CR \Rightarrow OW$.

Hash function applications

- ① Password storage (for login)
 - Store $h(PW)$, not PW , on computer
 - When user logs in, check hash of his PW against table.
 - Disclosure of $h(PW)$ should not reveal PW (or any equivalent pre-image)
 - Need OW
- ② File modification detector
 - For each file F , store $h(F)$ securely (e.g. on off-line DVD)
 - Can check if F has been modified by recomputing $h(F)$
 - need WCR (aka TCR)
(Adversary wants to change F but not $h(F)$.)
 - Hashes of downloadable software = equivalent problem.