Unsafe and Unsound
Cryptoanalysis of Leaky Acoustic Signals

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Abstract
Acoustic Cryptoanalysis is a side channel attack in which the attacker listens in on the sounds that are emitted from a laptop. These sounds come from the vibration of electrical components in the CPU’s voltage regulation circuit. In our experiment, using a Lenovo Thinkpad T20 and an iPhone 5s, we attempted to distinguish between CPU operations and extract RSA keys by listening in on the acoustic noise that was being leaked by the laptop during RSA decryption.
1 Introduction

1.1 Background Information

Electrical components in a CPU’s voltage regulation circuit vibrate as they struggle to supply constant voltage to the CPU despite fluctuations in power consumption caused by different operations. These electronic components in a CPU’s circuit vibrate to produce a high-pitched noise during operation. The acoustic signals vary according to the CPU’s workload, and can leak valuable information regarding the kinds of computations running.

A 2013 paper by Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer showed that it was possible to extract a 4096-bit RSA key from a laptop computer by analyzing the audible whine it emits during operation [1]. Their experiment was successful using rudimentary equipment. In one scenario, a cell phone was used to record sounds coming from the laptop.

1.2 Motivation and Objectives

Originally we had planned to extend the cryptoanalysis work done by Genkin, Shamir, and Tromer. After further contemplation, we felt that it would be a difficult and interesting enough project to implement the paper’s design and carry out an RSA key extraction attack using the equipment and software we had. By running such an experiment, we hoped to gain a better understanding of acoustic cryptoanalysis and make a conclusion on the feasibility of such an attack in real-world settings.

1.3 Related Work

Acoustic cryptoanalysis is only one of many side-channel attacks. Other examples include timing attacks to extract RSA keys. Timing attacks use the idea that depending on the inputs, certain operations will vary in time. This is usually done by sending multiple requests to the server and timing the responses to fine-tune the adversary’s guess on the private key. Another example that is closer to acoustic cryptoanalysis is being able to eavesdrop on someone typing on their keyboard. [3]

1.4 GnuPG implementation

We focus on GnuPG’s RSA decryption operations and how the operations are identified by their acoustic frequency spectrum. This can allow secret keys to be distinguished by the sound that is made when they are used. We use GnuPG’s modular exponentiation routine which is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem and improves the efficient of RSA decryption by a factor of about 4. We used version 1.4.15.

1.5 Distinguishing RSA keys

The acoustic signature of modular integer exponentiation depends on the modulus involved, therefore we should expect different keys to cause different sounds.
Using GnuPG to sign a fixed message using different RSA keys randomly generated, we can distinguish keys of interest.

1.6 Paper Outline

We will organize the paper as follows. First we start by introducing our experimental setup in section 2, which includes the recording devices and the laptops we used, and which ones gave successful results. We also describe our procedure to distinguish between different CPU operations. In section 3, we show how acoustic leakage easily allows differentiation between different RSA keys. We also present our approach for extracting RSA keys. Lastly, we discuss the successfullness of the experiment and the feasibility in section 4.

2 Setup and Preliminary Analysis

In this section, we describe the methods and approaches we used in our attempt to carry out an attack. We first describe our experimental set-up and our rationale behind choosing our equipment. We then describe the initial diagnostics performed to determine whether or not a laptop was suitable for our acoustics attack. Finally, we describe potential problems that arise from the occurrence of other signals.

2.1 Experimental Setup

The experiment required three main components (1) a microphone to record acoustic leakage, (2) a method to perform elementary signal processing, and (3) a suitable laptop to function as the attacked computer.

Microphone

We tried recording acoustic leakage with three different microphones.

- Samsung Galaxy S3 running Android
  The first microphone we used was an Android Samsung Galaxy S3. The sampling rate was not available on the phone’s official website, but based on online discussions and spectrograms produced by the phone, we estimated that the phone had a sampling rate of 48,000 kHz, which is the standard sampling rate for many microphones. By the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, this means that the phone can capture frequencies up to 24,000 kHz. However, the Android phone was only able to capture frequencies up to 22,000 kHz. This is most likely due to the other hardware inside the Android phone and the fact that Android phone is not intended to be used as a high-end recorder.

- Apple iPhone 5s with a Dayton iDevice Microphone:
  The second recording device, which became our main recording device for most of the project, was an iPhone 5s with a Dayton iDevice Microphone.
The iPhone 5s had the same sampling rate of 48,000kHz as the Android phone. We found that there was less distortion of signals on the spectrogram when using the iPhone instead of the Android phone. The Dayton iDevice Microphone gave us more flexibility in choosing where to put our microphone, which is very important for our set-up. The Android’s phone, on the other hand, had its microphone on the back, which made recording in certain positions difficult.

- **h4n Zoom Recorder:**
  The third recording device we used was a Zoom Recorder, which had a sampling rate of 96,000kHz. Using this recording device, we were able to view up to frequencies of 48,000kHz on our spectograms. The Zoom Recorder essentially has double the sampling rate than both the Android and iPhone. We found that the graphs concerning the RSA algorithm were not much clearer when using this microphone. However, we ultimately used the Apple iPhone for our final recordings because we felt more comfortable with the device.

**Signal Processing**

After obtaining recording samples from our microphone, we used a signal analyzer to convert the data to readable format, like a spectrogram. For the earlier stages of our project, we used signal analyzing programs from the phone. However, these signal analyzing allowed us at most to only take screenshots of the current screen. To get better graphs and results, we instead recorded the sounds and then did post-processing on a separate computer. For our final program, we used Baudline, which is a signal analyzer that provides spectrum analysis data visualization. Most of the graphs from our write-up were created using baudline.

**Laptop/Attacked Computer**

The most difficult part in our search for equipment was looking for a suitable laptop to run as the attacked computer. We were using our phones in the initial stages and due to a limited budget decided against purchasing better equipment. Most of the acoustic signals we wanted to see were at too high a frequency for the phones to record. Thus, we needed an older laptop. The reasoning behind finding an older laptop was that the processor would be much slower than say an i7 Intel Processor and that the capacitors would more likely be worn out and thus leak out more acoustic noise. We did, however, initially test to see if our current laptops would be suitable for the experiment.

We tried using a 13-Inch Macbook Pro and a Lenovo IdeaPad Y510p 15.6-Inch Laptop. The processors on both laptops were an i5 Intel Processor and i7 Intel Processor respectively. We were not able to capture acoustic signals on both laptops. We then borrowed a laptop from MIT class 6.01. The laptop was running on Athena Ubuntu with an i3 Processor. We were also not able to capture any acoustic signal on this laptop as well. We borrowed a fellow MIT student’s laptop, a Lenovo Thinkpad r61i. This laptop was running on Windows XP SP2 with an Intel Core Duo Processor (1.5GHz). This laptop was also not suitable for two important reasons. The processor was running CPU
instructions at too high a rate for our phones to actually record any acoustic signal. Secondly, we discovered that the capacitors in this laptop were very "deep" into the laptop. This made recording very difficult because we were not able to take apart the laptop, due to the fact that we were borrowing it and had to return it without tampering with the laptop in any way. Our next step was to find an even older laptop. We wanted to obtain a Lenovo Thinkpad T23, which according to the authors of the original paper, had very strong acoustic leakage that would be capturable by a phone’s microphone. We were, however, not able to obtain one. Instead, we managed to obtain a Lenovo Thinkpad T20. It was running on Windows XP S2 with an Intel Pentium III processor (650 MHz). Compared to the other laptops, the processor is much much slower, so we had a higher chance of actually seeing something relevant in our recordings.

We used this laptop in our final setup, so we will briefly describe how we found the ideal setup for this laptop.

Figure 1: This is the Lenovo Thinkpad T20. The circled regions are where we placed our microphone in order to find the best position to record acoustic leakage. All of these provide a good signal, but we found a better place to put our microphone later.

Figure 2: This is the back of the Lenovo Thinkpad T20.

The back of the Lenovo Thinkpad T20 included most of the connections that would be seen on a laptop today. For example, the USB drive, the printer, and the monitor output, and the power supply was all located on the back of the laptop. We tried recording close to each of these connections, but did not find this to be ideal. We were also using a USB wireless mouse because it was nearly impossible to use the laptop otherwise, which may or may not have interfered with the signal.
The right side of the laptop was not very useful in providing acoustic leakage. This may have been due to the fact that there were not a lot of openings here.

Unlike the right side, the left side proved to be more promising. There were stronger acoustic signals on this side overall. The strongest came from the PCMCIA card slot. Below is a figure of our final setup.

2.2 Acoustic Signals and CPU Operations

In order to determine whether or not we can extract RSA keys from a laptop, we had to first run a diagnostics test on the laptop to see if we could differentiate between different CPU operations. Despite limitations in our equipment, we were able to see interesting patterns that allowed us to recognize certain CPU instructions. For our diagnostics, we used HLT, MEM (L1 cache miss), and MUL (multiplication CPU instruction). We will now describe our procedure. It should be noted that we recorded these sounds when the power settings were maximized and the power supply was plugged in. The original paper stated that doing these two things would ensure a better reading. By maximizing the power settings, we could be sure that the CPU was not being
underclocked. Here are the steps that we took, in order.

1. Obtain a spectrogram of the laptop under normal conditions.
2. Obtain a spectrogram of the laptop while running the HLT command in 1 sec loops.
3. Obtain a spectrogram of the laptop while running the HLT and MUL command in 1 sec loops.
4. Obtain a spectrogram of the laptop while running the HLT, MUL, and MEM command in 1 sec loops.
5. Obtain a spectrogram of the laptop while running several CPU in 1 sec loops and slowly decrease the time of the loops in subsequent iterations.

The first step is to obtain a regular reading of the laptop under normal circumstances, during which we did nothing to the laptop. This enabled us to see what the laptop’s spectrogram looked like while nothing was being run. This is important to be able to differentiate when we actually run CPU instructions on the laptop.

The second step was then to record what HLT looked like. We ran HLT for 1 sec in an infinite loop for this step. HLT is a special command that is important for our analysis. It is a kernel command and halts the CPU completely until the next interrupt is signaled. As will be shown in the graphs, HLT is one of the most distinguishable operations. If we are able to see a difference between when the laptop is running under normal conditions and when the laptop is running with the HLT command, we continue on with the diagnostics.

In the third step, we ran both the HLT and MUL command in 1 sec loops. The purpose of this step is to be able to see what MUL looks like. Because we know what HLT looks like, if we are indeed able to see CPU operations, MUL will be easily identifiable.

After successfully determining whether or not we can differentiate between HLT and MUL, we move on to the next step. The fourth step involves running three instructions: HLT, MUL, and MEM in 1 second loops. From the previous step, we know how HLT and MUL look like. We can then try to see if we can determine where MEM is.

Finally, if the fourth step can be completed, we know that we are able to see and distinguish between some CPU operations. The fifth step is to see how well we can see different CPU operations. For this step, we run a program that executes several different instructions, such as NOP, HLT, MUL, FMUL, and MEM. It first runs all the instructions in 1 second. Then it runs the same set of instructions faster (ie: 0.8 seconds) in the next iteration.
Figure 6: A spectrogram obtained from step four. The CPU instructions have been highlighted.

Using the Thinkpad T20, we were able to differentiate between the HLT, MUL, and MEM instructions. As shown in the graph in figure 6, the CPU instructions were quite distinct on our graphs. At first sight, the graphs may be a bit difficult to read. Spectrograms record frequency versus time. Each row (in this particular example, each highlighted row) represents a different CPU instruction. The rows that are very bright green are the HLTs. We highlighted MUL and MEM as well. As one can see, the pattern repeats in the graph, implying that we are able to capture different CPU instructions consistently.

Figure 7: A spectrogram obtained from step five.
Unfortunately, with our limitations in equipment, we were not able to successfully complete step five. We were able to recognize the HLT instructions, but were not able to identify most of the other instructions. This is to be expected. Most of the key distinguishing characteristics of these other operations are at a higher frequency. \(^1\) As it turns out, however, successfully completing step five was not necessary for RSA key extraction.

### 2.3 Obstables during Recording

During our experiment, we encountered obstables. This is to be expected as we are running this experiment in a real-world setting. The obvious obstable, as mentioned in the experiment setup, was our microphone, which was limited in the frequencies it could capture. To compensate for our recording device, we chose an old laptop. The other obstacle was not as obvious and something we discovered when we ran the diagnostics test on several laptops. It also occurred in a lot of the laptops we tested against. We found a destructive signal that leaked at around 21kHz. It also distorted the rest of the spectogram. We later discovered that it was an electro-magnetic wave coming from the fan, which turned on whenever the computer was too hot. We worked around this problem by letting the laptop idle. When the laptop was cool enough, the fan would turn off by itself.

![Figure 8: A spectogram of the EM wave from the fan. The blue highlights where the wave is. As we can see, the EM wave distorts the graph at other frequencies as well.](image)

### 3 GnuPG RSA Key Extraction

The results of the previous section demonstrate that using our set-up, it is possible to distinguish between CPU operations running on the laptop. Our

\(^1\)With better equipment, the original authors were able to distinguish between a lot more instructions.
preliminary analysis confirms that acoustic signals emanating from a target laptop leak information about the underlying code. In this section, we discuss the specifics of our side-channel attack on GnuPG RSA and summarize our key extraction experiment as well as present our findings.

The authors of [1] identified a common RSA implementation, GnuPG, specifically GnuPG 1.x series, as vulnerable to an acoustic side-channel attack. Through preliminary analysis, we decided to target GnuPG 1.4.15 compiled with MinGW gcc version 4.6.2 compiler on a Thinkpad T20 running Windows XP.

We briefly describe the weakness in GnuPG’s RSA implementation that makes it vulnerable to our side-channel attack. ²

3.1 GnuPG RSA

The ciphertext that we pass to GnuPG’s decryption algorithm is directly passed to it’s underlying modular exponentiation routine along with the secret key $d$ and the integers $p$ and $q$. Within the routine, the ciphertext is first reduced modulus the integers, and the reduced ciphertext is used in a multiplication routine that is repeated 2048 times. The repetition amplifies the acoustic leakage over several cycles, and we can observe any differences in the patterns more easily.

Recall that GnuPG RSA’s decryption algorithm uses CRT as an optimization. As a result, the modular exponentiation first operates modulo $p$, and then switches over to operating in modulo $q$. The acoustic leakage created in each case is distinct, and is discernible on the spectrogram. We present our analysis of RSA’s acoustic leakage in Section 3.2.

We implement the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack described in [1] to extract individual bits of the exponent. Once either exponent $p$, $q$ is extracted, extracting the secret key $d$ is trivial. Let the binary representation of integer $q$ be $q_0$, $q_{n-1},...,q_1$. Assume that we have already extracted the high $i-1$ bits of $q$, and let $c^{i-1}$ be the 2048 bit ciphertext whose high $i-1$ bits are equal to those of $q$, whose $i^{th}$ bit is 0, and remaining bits are 1. Consider decrypting using ciphertext $c^{i-1}$. This ciphertext is first reduced with exponent $q$ in a bit-by-bit manner. Depending on the value of $q$, two things happen:

- $q_i = 1$ Then $c_i^{i-1} < q$ and is not reduced. Our structured ciphertext is passed into the multiplication routine 2048 times.
- $q_i = 0$ Then $qc_i^{i-1} \geq q$ and is reduced. A random-looking $c$ that is shorter than 2048 bits is passed into the multiplication routine 2048 times.

In section 2, we established that CPU operations like multiplications could be distinguished by analyzing acoustic leakage. We extend the results to distinguishing multiplication operations with structured 2048-bit binary numbers.

²The focus of this section is our experience implementing the attack, and for a more in-depth understanding of the attack, please refer to [1]
from that of multiplication operations with shorter, random-looking binary numbers. This is central to our attack and our analysis of the chosen-ciphertext decryption is presented in Section 3.3.

3.2 RSA Key Distinguishability

Our analysis required us to first identify what the acoustic leakage of a GnuPG RSA decryption looked like. From our preliminary analysis, we discovered that HLT’s acoustic leakage generates a good visual marker in the spectrogram. We ran five identical decryptions on a fixed GnuPG message using the same secret key interleaved with HLT messages. The spectrogram produced a clear acoustic signature for the RSA decryption as seen in figure 9.

![Figure 9: A spectrogram obtained from decrypting a fixed gnuPG message five times. The HLT instructions have been darkened.](image)

Moreover, the spectrogram captured the acoustic leakage that occurred during the transition between modulo \( p \) and modulo \( q \) operations as seen in figure 10. This is important to our attack as the spectral signature during this transition serves as a signature for the key in general; i.e. different keys have different spectral signatures, and this difference is specially noticeable during the transition between \( p \) and \( q \).
Finally, we encrypted a fixed message using five different RSA keys, and ran the decryption algorithm on each of them i.e. fixed message, different keys. We created a program that calls an infinite loop of these five decryption invocations as seen in figure 11. We analyzed the transition between \( p \) and \( q \) on the spectrogram, and confirmed that different keys could be distinguished based on their transitions (figure 12).

The ability to identify keys can prove to be extremely advantageous in other attacks as well where the acoustic traffic is monitored and the identification of rarely-used keys can reveal something about the situation.
Figure 11: A spectrogram representing acoustic leakage of five decryptions, each decrypting the same fixed message but with different keys. The spectrogram shows 3 iterations of the infinite loop each decrypting five times (blue blocks). The white circle encloses p-q transitions of five different keys and is enlarged in figure 12.

Figure 12: Enlarged cross-section of spectrogram in figure 11. The clarity of the p-q transitions is only limited by our equipment. Even using our elementary set-up, we are able to see the unique signature for each of the 5 keys as seen within each circle.
3.3 RSA Key Extraction

Because different keys cause different sounds, we were able to use GnuPG to help distinguish between RSA secret keys. To extract the secret key, it is sufficient that we extract either \( p \) or \( q \). We implement an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack that exposes the RSA exponent bit-by-bit as explained in Section 3.1.

Creating chosen-ciphertext \( c^{i,1} \)

The chosen ciphertext \( c^{i,1} \) is structured as the 2048 bit ciphertext whose high \( i-1 \) bits are equal to those of \( q \), whose \( i^{th} \) bit is 0, and remaining bits are 1, where RSA exponent \( q \) be \( q_0, q_{n-1}, ..., q_1 \). While the paper [1] brushes over creating the ciphertext, and invoking RSA decryption on the created GnuPG message, we found this part of the experiment quite challenging.

Encryptions using GnuPG RSA generate a GnuPG file which is formatted according to the OpenPGP Message Format found at [4]. Our goal is to create a valid GnuPG file containing the chosen-ciphertext that is correctly processed by GnuPG. To do so, we first tried to manually create a GnuPG file from scratch containing our ciphertext. We had to understand the steps involved during GnuPG RSA encryption, and because of the lack of documentation regarding GnuPG’s src directory, this was not easy. Instead we implemented a shortcut using the following steps:

1. During RSA encryption, GnuPG invokes a \texttt{public(MPI output, RSA-public-key *pkey)} method to carry out the exponentiation. 

2. We modified the method so that it doesn’t perform any of the regular RSA encryption steps, but simply returns our chosen-ciphertext. See Appendix A for clarification.

3. Our hope was that a decryption call would fetch the ciphertext, our \( c^{i,1} \), from the GnuPG file and decrypt successfully.

When we try invoking GnuPG --decrypt <ciphertext>, our call failed. However, this doesn’t affect the success of our attack. This is because GnuPG uses a hybrid cryptosystem to optimize for speed and security in which GnuPG creates a one-time secret key from a random number. This session key is used while encrypting the plaintext using a symmetric algorithm (eg. AES256). Once the data is encrypted, the session key is then encrypted to the recipient’s public key. This public key-encrypted session key is transmitted along with the ciphertext to the recipient. When we decrypt using RSA, the private key is used to decrypt the secret session key used, which in turn decrypts the ciphertext.

It is important to note that the value of the decrypted ciphertext does not effect our analysis, only that our ciphertext, \( c^{i,1} \), was used during encryption/decryption with the correct exponent \( q \). After carefully analyzing where our decryption failed, we realized that while GnuPG RSA was correctly decrypting the session key, but the session key used to encrypt the plaintext was

\footnote{MPI refers to Multi Precision Integers. GnuPG uses MPIs to represent large integers as big-endian 8-bit octets.}
now invalid (because we have changed the underlying ciphertext). Subsequently, our RSA decryption was happening as intended and we should observe acoustic leakage that exposed bit $q_i$ even though we did not find out the value of the decrypted ciphertext.

While we understand that this is not a realistic attack scenario, we believe that this shortcut preserves the experiment’s objectives—analyzing acoustic leakage during RSA decryption to extract secret key.

**Extracting bit $q_i$**

We decrypted the ciphertext using the same key five times interleaved with HLT operations and recorded the acoustic leakage emanating from the laptop. During the first run, we set the ciphertext, $c_i$, to be the 2048 binary number $0b1011\ldots111$, implying that we are extracting the second bit, $q_{2047}$. The spectrogram highlighted the transition between modulo $p$ and modulo $q$ as seen in figure 13. The attack described in [1] discusses steps to create templates that the generated spectrograms can be compared against. We use the ones in the paper as our template and deduced that the attacked bit is $q_{2047} = 1$.

We extracted the next bit using the ciphertext $0b11011\ldots111$. Continuing this attack two more times resulted in similar spectrograms, and we deduced that the attacked bits were all 1. While attacking $q_{2044}$, we encountered our first $q_i = 0$ bit. Our analysis confirmed this as the spectrogram generated was unlike the ones generated for $q_i = 1$ bits. Comparing it to the [1], we concluded that bit $q_{2044} = 0$ and produces a unique acoustic signature as seen in figure 14.
Figure 13: Attacked bit is one

Figure 14: Attacked bit is zero
4 Discussion

Our goal was to carry out the experiment that Genkin, Shamir, and Tromer carried out, specifically to be able to distinguish between CPU operations, distinguishing between RSA secret keys, and extracting a few bits from RSA keys. Overall, we were successful, despite early struggles in attempting to find equipment, laptops and recording devices, that would provide us any results. The most difficult area was extracting the bits from the RSA keys.

We began our analysis by attempting to distinguish various operations performed by the CPU of the laptop, and were able to detect certain patterns that allowed us to recognize HLT, MEM, and MUL instructions. The reasoning behind our procedure is as follows - being able to know what a certain CPU operation looks like on our spectrogram allows us to identify other operations by running an extra operation each time until we were able to see all.

Next, after gaining confirmation that acoustic signals do leak information about underlying code, we tried to distinguish different keys based on their different spectral signatures, and were able to identify them by looking at the transitions between p and q on the spectrograms. The ability to determine such could be even clearer if we were to have better equipment. Lastly, we focused on constructing a chosen ciphertext attack needed to extract RSA keys.

Looking at our results, we felt that our project was successful in meeting its aims. We managed to extract RSA key bits, which was our initial goal. We did not expect to be able to extract keys, given our long search for an appropriate computer, and were quite pleased when we managed to do so. In terms of what went well, we felt that the analysis part of the project – where we tested potential laptops, differentiated CPU operations, differentiated between different RSA keys, and RSA key extraction went well. This was because we understood the mechanics of acoustic cryptoanalysis very well through research and discussion.

We felt, however, that the search for equipment did not go as well. The high-end microphones that were able to capture high frequencies were very costly and well beyond the budget of our group. Because we were not able to acquire a decent microphone, we had to make sure we chose a very old laptop to ensure that we would be able to capture signals. This part, we felt, was very much out of our hands.

If we could do things differently, we may have considered looking at older laptops beforehand. It took a lot of time for us to find the Thinkpad T20. Most of the time, we were testing out laptops that were outputting frequencies much higher than we could capture. We felt that while this was a valuable learning experience, we could have saved more time if we had used an older laptop in the first place.
5 Conclusion

Although we have successfully implemented the experiment, there are many next steps to attempt. Executing such experiments on laptops other than the Lenovo Thinkpad T20 as well as various models and/or various operating systems and other version of GnuPG, could help emphasize such results as well as provide a whole new area to research. It is suggested the signal quality and effective attack distance vary according to the computer’s age. In addition, to distinguish keys of interest in many applications, it may be possible to distinguish between algorithms, different implementations of an algorithm, or different computers running the same algorithm.

For other groups interested in carrying out this attack, we recommend using a very old laptop with an old processor, because that increases the chance of the microphone being able to listen in on the computer. We also recommend the group to carry out our initial diagnostics on each computer they attempt this on to see whether or not it is feasible to carry out the actual attack.

In terms of feasibility in a realistic setting, acoustics cryptoanalysis is all very dependent on the equipment of the attacker and the laptop being attacked. In order to successfully extract RSA keys, the attack must have a powerful enough microphone to be able to capture high frequencies. The laptop must also be leaking acoustic signals at a low enough rate for the microphone to be able to capture it. So, while the attack is very possible, the attacker may not have a lot of freedom in choosing whose keys to extract.

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7 Appendix

For the RSA key extraction, we chose our ciphertext by using the modified public function in cipher/rsa.c:

```c
static void public(MPI output, MPI input, RSA public key *pkey )
{
    const char *str = "CHosen ciphertext HERE";
    mpifromstr(output, str);
}
```

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8 Reference


