Part (a)

To decode the ciphertexts, we XORed them together, which gives $C_1 \oplus C_2 = (M_1 \oplus P) \oplus (M_2 \oplus P) = M_1 \oplus M_2$. Thus the pad P is irrelevant. Then we found a set of 8-character words from an English dictionary. For each M_1 in this set, we constructed M_2 by XORing M_1 with $C_1 \oplus C_2$, since $M_1 \oplus (C_1 \oplus C_2) = M_1 \oplus (M_1 \oplus M_2) = M_2$. Lastly, we checked if M_2 was also in the set. If both M_1 and M_2 were in the set (as valid English words), then we outputted them.

```
C1 = [0xe9, 0x3a, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0xfc, 0x73, 0x55, 0xd5]
C2 = [0xf4, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xc7, 0xe1, 0x68, 0x4a, 0xdf]
M1_XOR_M2 = [c ^ d for c, d in zip(C1, C2)]
with open('/usr/share/dict/words', 'r') as words_file:
  words = words_file.read().split()
  words = set([word for word in words if len(word) == len(M1_XOR_M2)])
  for word1 in words:
    M1 = [ord(c) for c in word1]
    M2 = [c ^ d for c, d in zip(M1, M1_XOR_M2)]
    word2 = ''.join([chr(c) for c in M2])
    if word2 in words:
      pad = [c ^ d for c, d in zip(M1, C1)]
      print 'word1 = %s, word2 = %s, pad = %s' % (word1, word2, pad)
```

Output of running the code:

```
word1 = networks, word2 = security, pad = [135, 95, 157, 178, 147, 1, 62, 166]
word1 = security, word2 = networks, pad = [154, 95, 138, 176, 142, 26, 33, 172]
```

Though their ordering is indiscernible, the two words are `security` and `networks`.

Part (b)

Messages and Pad

```
We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography.
Probabilistic encryption is the use of randomness in an encr
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols that
This document will detail a vulnerability in the ssh cryptog
MIT developed Kerberos to protect network services provided
NIST announced a competition to develop a new cryptographic
Diffie-Hellman establishes a shared secret that can be used
Public-key cryptography refers to a cryptographic system req
The keys used to sign the certificates had been stolen from
We hope this inspires others to work in this fascinating fie
```

```
pad = [119, 75, 116, 51, 85, 113, 72, 105, 76, 78, 114, 79, 84, 49, 71, 101,
       71, 88, 116, 78, 113, 102, 113, 87, 84, 65, 51, 55, 99, 56, 107, 69,
       116, 105, 110, 109, 97, 113, 79, 106, 122, 68, 66, 98, 77, 72, 112,
       72, 55, 53, 104, 54, 99, 71, 87, 97, 68, 98, 112, 49]
```

Process This part's code was more interactive because, due to Ben's addition of feedback, we couldn't simply XOR the 10 ciphertexts together and look up possible messages in the dictionary. Our plan of attack was to first calculate all possible pad bytes (p_i's) that would result in valid and likely English characters (letters and common punctuation) from all 10 ciphertexts.

```
valid_chars = set(range(65, 65 + 26) + range(97, 97 + 26) +  # A-Z, a-z
                  [32, 44, 46, 63, 33, 45, 40, 41])          # space, ,.?!-()
```

Let's consider a particular index i in the 60-character messages ($0 \leq i < 60$). For our purposes, p_i is independent from the pad bytes surrounding it, because it only depends on m_i, c_i, and c_{i-1} (as the `calculate_pad` function below shows). We could have tried all 2^8 possible p_i's, but $|$`valid_chars`$|$ is only 60. Therefore, we took each valid character, calculated which p_i would result in that character in the first ciphertext, and checked if it resulted in valid characters for the other 9 ciphertexts.

```
def calculate_pad(ctext, msg, prev_c=0):
  assert len(ctext) == len(msg)
  pad = []
  for i in xrange(len(ctext)):
    p = ((ctext[i] ^ msg[i]) - prev_c) % 256
    pad.append(p)
    prev_c = ctext[i]
  return pad

def prev_c_at(ciph, index):
  return 0 if index == 0 else ciph[index - 1]
def ctext_at(ciph, index):
  return ciph[index:index + 1]

msglen = 60
possible_pad_bytes = [[] for _ in range(msglen)]
for index in range(msglen):
  for c in valid_chars:
    possible_pad_byte = calculate_pad(ctext_at(tenciphs[0], index), [c],
                                      prev_c=prev_c_at(tenciphs[0], index))
    is_valid = True
    for ciph in tenciphs:
      msg = ben_decrypt(ctext_at(ciph, index), possible_pad_byte,
                        prev_c=prev_c_at(ciph, index))
      if not set(msg).issubset(valid_chars):
        is_valid = False
        break
    if is_valid:
      possible_pad_bytes[index].append(possible_pad_byte[0])
```

This calculated all possible p_i's at each i, which is a good start since some choice of $P = p_1, \ldots, p_{60}$ within these p_i's would result in Ben's messages. However, here's the issue:

```
>>> [len(p) for p in possible_pad_bytes]
[20, 6, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 4, 1, 1, 1, 8, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3,
 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 4, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 9, 1, 4, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2,
 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 3, 2, 1]
```

There is a combinatorial explosion of $20 \times 6 \times \cdots \times 1$, over 2^{47}, choices for P. However, there are a tractable 480 choices for the first 9 bytes. We figured that we could restrict the problem to first choosing those: listing all 480 $p_1, \ldots, p_9$ pads, decrypting the first 9 bytes of the 10 ciphertexts with each pad, and checking which pads gave intelligible English plaintext.

While we could scan the plaintext manually, we preferred to have the computer do it and score its intelligibility. So, we loaded an English dictionary (the Ubuntu dictionary is excellent; it even contains `Hellman`). For each set of 10 plaintext messages, we checked how many valid English words from the dictionary appeared in it and gave it $|\texttt{word}|^2$ points for each `word` that did. This scoring function strongly favors longer words like `cryptography`. Lastly, we outputted the best-scoring messages and pad.

```
def recursively_expand_pad(cur_pad, cur_index, words):
  if cur_index == msglen:  # To start, msglen is 9 instead of 60.
    # Reached the leaves of our search, so decrypt the 10 ciphertexts and score the
    # resulting text.
    texts = [bytes_to_text(ben_decrypt(ciph[:msglen], cur_pad)) for ciph in tenciphs]
    text_to_score = '\n'.join(texts).lower()
    score = sum(len(word)**2 for word in words if word in text_to_score)
    return (score, texts, cur_pad)
  else:
    best_score = 0; best_texts = None; best_pad = None
    for p in possible_pad_bytes[cur_index]:
      score, texts, pad = recursively_expand_pad(cur_index + 1, cur_pad + [p], words)
      if best_score < score:
        best_score = score; best_texts = texts; best_pad = pad
    return (best_score, best_texts, best_pad)

with open('/usr/share/dict/words', 'r') as words_file:
  words = set([word.lower() for word in words_file.read().split()])
  _, texts, pad = recursively_expand_pad(0, [], words)
  print 'messages = %s, pad = %s' % (texts, pad)
```

Output of running the code:

```
messages = ['We stand ', 'Probabili', 'Secure So', 'This docu', 'MIT devel',
            'NIST anno', 'Diffie-He', 'Public-ke', 'The keys ', 'We hope t'],
     pad = [119, 75, 116, 51, 85, 113, 72, 105, 76]
```

We could have searched these plaintext prefixes on Google, but we decided to continue running our code to choose $p_9, \ldots, p_{18}$ (often the messages we want to decrypt won't be available online). First we wrote the `pad` above to `possible_pad_bytes[0:9]` (so there is only 1 choice for p_i, $0 \leq i < 9$), and then we increased `msglen` to 18. Output of rerunning the code:

```
messages = ['We stand today on ', 'Probabilistic encr', 'Secure Sockets Lay',
            'This document will', 'MIT developed Kerb', 'NIST announced a c',
            'Diffie-Hellman est', 'Public-key cryptog', 'The keys used to s',
            'We hope this inspi'],
     pad = [119, 75, 116, 51, 85, 113, 72, 105, 76, 78, 114, 79, 84, 49, 71,
            101, 71, 88]
```

Repeating this process 4×, we eventually got the desired output (pasted at the beginning) for all 60 characters. At this point, we manually checked it with online articles to be confident in our decryption. For instance, `We stand today`... appears in a well-cited 1976 paper by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman.