

Last class:

Equality of distributions

One-time security: $\forall m, m' \in \mathcal{M}: \text{Enc}(K, m) \stackrel{\text{d}}{\equiv} \text{Enc}(K, m')$

where K is random in \mathcal{K}

One-Time Pad: $\text{Enc}(k, m) = k \oplus m$

perfect security!

Today:

Many-time security

Pseudo-random functions

Construction

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

Definition:

Indistinguishability against Chosen plaintext attacks

(Ind CPA, or CPA for short):

An encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) is CPA secure if for any

m_1, m_2, \dots, m_t in \mathcal{M} and m'_1, m'_2, \dots, m'_t in \mathcal{M}

$$(\text{Enc}(k, m_1), \dots, \text{Enc}(k, m_t)) \stackrel{\cong}{\approx} (\text{Enc}(k, m'_1), \dots, \text{Enc}(k, m'_t))$$

↑
computational
indistinguishability

where k is random in \mathcal{K} .

Intuitively, computationally indistinguishable means

indistinguishable in practice!

Definition: Two distribution ensembles $\{A_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\{B_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ are

computationally indistinguishable if for any polynomial time

distinguisher D and every n ,

$$|\Pr[D(a)=1] - \Pr[D(b)=1]| = \text{negl}$$

where a is sampled from A_n , b is sampled from B_n .

Intuitively, negl means 0 in practice.

Definition: A function μ is negligible if for every constant c in \mathbb{N} there exists a constant n_c s.t. for every $n > n_c$ $\mu(n) < n^{-c}$

Remark: The definition of CPA security stated above is a simplified (and weaker) form of the actual definition. In the actual definition the messages can be chosen in an adaptive manner, and the definition is a "game based" definition

Definition: Indistinguishability against Chosen plaintext attacks

(Ind CPA, or CPA for short):

An encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) is CPA secure if every efficient adversary

Adv wins in the following game with probability at most $1/2 + \text{negligible}$:

Challenger




Adv

choose a random key k

Choose a random bit b

$$c^{(1)} = \text{Enc}(k, m^{(1)})$$

$$c^{(2)} = \text{Enc}(k, m^{(2)})$$



output bit b'

Adv wins if and only if $b' = b$.

Construction of a CPA secure encryption

Suppose: There exists a keyed function F , such that for every

x_1, x_2, \dots, x_t in the domain, it holds that

$$F(k, x_1), F(k, x_2), \dots, F(k, x_t) \cong (u, u, \dots, u)$$

Such a function is called a pseudo-random function (PRF).

A PRF is a function that generates (fake) randomness!

Theorem: There exists a PRF assuming the existence of a one-way function

Let $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be a function.

Definition: f is a one-way function if it is easy to compute but hard to invert.

Easy: There is a poly-time algorithm that on input x outputs $f(x)$.

Hard: For any poly-time algorithm A there exists a negligible function μ

s.t. for every n , $\Pr[A(y)=x \text{ s.t. } f(x)=y] = \mu(n)$

where the probability is over y distributed by choosing a random u in $\{0,1\}^n$ and setting $y=f(u)$.

In practice: Use AES as a PRF.

A CPA secure encryption scheme using a PRF F :

$$\text{Enc}(k,m;r) = (r, m \oplus F(k,r))$$

$$\text{Dec}(k,(r,c)) = c \oplus F(k,r)$$

The security follows from the security of the PRF and the security of the one-time pad.

