

Admin:

Pset #3 due 4/5 (Mon)

Take-home quiz out 4/5 due 4/21 (Wed)

Projects!

Guest lecture by Jim Bidzos on 4/12 (Mon)

Today:Digital Signatures!


- Diffie-Hellman concept of PK signatures
- ACMA defn of security ("Adaptive chosen message attack")
- Textbook RSA signatures
- Hash & Sign (Full Domain Hash)
- Schnorr ID scheme
- Fiat-Shamir paradigm
- Schnorr signatures
- Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) by NIST

# Diffie & Hellman ("New Directions in Cryptography") 1976

- $Gen(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (PK, SK, M, C)$   
 $|M| = |C|$   
 ↗ ciphertext space  
 ↘ message space


- $Enc(PK, \cdot)$  maps  $M$  to  $C$  1 to 1  
efficiently computable

- $Dec(SK, \cdot)$  maps  $C$  to  $M$  1 to 1



Enc & Dec are inverse functions (given PK & SK)

- For signatures, we rename Enc as Verify, Dec as Sign



$\sigma = \text{Sign}(SK, m)$       $\sigma = \text{signature on } m \text{ by } SK$

Verify by checking if  $\text{Verify}(PK, \sigma) = m$  ?

Correctness:  $\text{Verify}(PK, \sigma) = m$   
 if  $\sigma = \text{Sign}(SK, m)$   
 (Security defined in a bit...)  $SK$

Enc & Dec are trapdoor permutations  
(SK is trapdoor)

SK is "signing key"

PK is "signature verification key"

$$\sigma = \text{Sign}(SK, m)$$

$$\text{Verify}(PK, m, \sigma) \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$$

(Note: have pulled m inside as arg to Verify)

Security:

Signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Verify) is

secure against adaptive chosen message attack

if  $(\forall \text{PPT } A)$  (Adversary)

$$\Pr \left[ A^{\text{Sign}(SK, \cdot)}(PK) = (m^*, \sigma^*) \text{ such that}$$

$$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$$

$$\text{Verify}(PK, m^*, \sigma^*) = \text{true} \\ \& \ m^* \text{ was not ever given to } \text{Sign}$$

$$\left. \right] \\ = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

i.e. Adversary cannot forge a new message/

signature pair, even after having seen signatures

for polynomially many messages of his choice.

ACMA

## Textbook RSA signatures:

$$\bullet \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{PK}, \text{SK}, M, \mathcal{C})$$

$$\text{PK} = (n, e)$$

$$\text{SK} = (n, d) \quad d = e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$

$$\bullet \text{Sign}(\text{SK}, m) \rightarrow \sigma = m^d \pmod{n}$$

$$\bullet \text{Verify}(\text{PK}, m, \sigma) = \text{true iff } \sigma^e = m \pmod{n}$$

This is just basic RSA encryption "turned around"!

This is not secure against ACMA:

• if  $\sigma$  is signature for  $m$

then  $\sigma^2$  is signature for  $m^2$

• Worse:  $\sigma$  is signature for  $m = \sigma^e \pmod{n}$

How to fix?

## Hash & Sign (aka Full Domain Hash)

Assume  $H$  is a hash function mapping messages (of arbitrary length) to  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  where  $H$  is modeled as "random oracle".

Idea: Sign  $H(m)$  rather than signing  $m$ .

Note: This provides efficiency gains for long messages, as  $H$  is fast.

Claim: This scheme is now secure against ACMA in ROM, under RSA Assumption

(hard to compute  $x^d$ , given  $n, e, x \bmod n$ )

Note:  $\text{Sign}(SK, m) = H(m)^d \pmod{n}$

$\text{Verify}(PK, m, \sigma) = \text{true}$  iff  $\sigma \stackrel{e}{=} H(m) \pmod{n}$ .

Proof of claim (sketch):

- Without signing oracle, hard to compute any valid signature, since this requires breaking RSA assumption
- With signing oracle: Adv can compute transcript of requests to Sign himself, so he learns nothing from Sign. Idea: "program"  $M$ ! Given  $m$ , choose  $\sigma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*$  compute  $r = \sigma^e \pmod{n}$ , program  $M(m) = r$ , output  $\sigma$  as signature for  $m$ .

(If Adv asks for  $H(m)$ , where  $m$  previously unseen, choose random  $\sigma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ , set  $r = \sigma^e \pmod n$  return  $H(m) = r$ .)

## Schnorr Signature Scheme

- Based on Schnorr Identification Scheme & Fiat-Shamir paradigm
- Basis for NIST Digital Signature Standard.

## Schnorr Identification Scheme

- Prove knowledge of  $x$ , for  $PK = g^x$
- Group  $G$  has prime order  $q$  public  
 $g$  is a generator of  $G$   $g$  public
- E.g. work mod  $p$ , where  $p = q \cdot r + 1$  and  $q$  is prime
- $G = \{ h^r \pmod p, h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \}$   
 $|G| = q$
- To find  $g$  generator of  $G$ , choose  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ,  $h^r \neq 1 \pmod p$ ; let  $g = h^r \pmod p$ .
- Typically  $p$  has 1024 bits (to defeat DL attacks)  
 $q$  has 160 bits (to defeat birthday attacks)

User has keypair  $(g^x, x)$  for  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$   
 $\uparrow$  PK  $\uparrow$  SK

Prover P

Verifier V

(knows  $x$ )

(knows  $g^x$ )

$k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

Commit  $\rightarrow$

$r = g^k \pmod{p}$

challenge  $\leftarrow$

$e$

$e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  ("random challenge")

response  $\rightarrow$

$s = k - x e$

Accepts iff  $g^s = r / PK^e$

Note:  $g^s = g^{k-xe} = r / (g^x)^e = r / PK^e$

Claim: Prover "must know" SK  $x$  if he can answer most challenges  $\leftarrow \begin{matrix} e_i \\ s_i \end{matrix}$

Pf idea: Suppose Prover can answer  $e_1$  and  $e_2$

$g^{s_1} PK^{e_1} = g^{s_2} PK^{e_2} = r$

$\Rightarrow g^{(s_1-s_2)/(e_2-e_1)} = PK$

$\Rightarrow \frac{(s_1-s_2)}{(e_2-e_1)}$  is SK  $x$  !

Prover "knows"  $x$  !

Claim: Verifier gains no information about  $x$ .  
↳ "Honest" (who picks  $e$  at random from  $Z_{q_0}$ )

Proof idea:

Verifier can generate transcript on his own! (from PK)

$$\text{transcript} = (PK, r, e, s)$$


How?

Verifier chooses  $e$  at random from  $Z_q$   
 $s$  at random from  $Z_q$

$$\text{computes } r = g^s PK^e \quad \square$$

(called Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge)

How to convert a three-round public coin ID protocol to a digital signature scheme?





H is  
hash  
function  
(CR)

Answer: Fiat-Shamir heuristic

→ Let  $e = H(m, r)$  ROM

$\text{Sign}(SK, m) = (r, e, s)$   
where  $e = H(m, r)$

$\text{Verify}(PK, m, (r, e, s))$

accepts if verifier of ID scheme accepts

Claim: We can use Fiat-Shamir to convert Schnorr ID scheme to a (secure) Schnorr signature scheme, (secure against ACMA)

$$\sigma = (r, e, s) = (g^k, H(m, r), k - x \cdot H(m, r))$$

Proof ideas:

Seeing sigs of other messages is just like seeing attacks on ID protocol - just seeing  $H(m, r)$  instead of verifier's  $e$ . Zero-knowledge property of ID protocol gives attacker no benefit.

If Adversary can forge, he must be able to supply good response to many possible  $e$ 's (possible  $H(m, r)$  values). This implies he "knows" SK  $x$ .



## Digital Signature Standard (DSA)

Like Schnorr signature scheme, except:

- $r$  is computed as  $g^k \pmod{p} \pmod{q}$   
(for shorter signatures)

- $e = H(m)$  rather than  $e = H(m, r)$

(This version not known to be secure in ROM. (Insecure in Schnorr but not known to be insecure in DSA)).

## DSA details

Setup:  $q = 160$  bit prime  
 $p = 1024$  bit prime s.t.  $q \mid p-1$   
 $g = h^{(p-1)/q}$  generates group of order  $q$

Gen:  $SK = x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$   
 $PK = g^x$  (PK = y below)

Sign:  $k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  (must be random & new!)

$$r = (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q \quad \text{restart if } r = 0$$

$$s = \left( \frac{H(m) + xr}{k} \right) \bmod q \quad \text{restart if } s = 0$$

$$\sigma = (r, s)$$

Verify (PK, m,  $\sigma$ )

Check that  $0 < r < q$  &  $0 < s < q$

$$w = s^{-1} \pmod{q}$$

$$u_1 = H(m) \cdot w \pmod{q}$$

$$u_2 = r \cdot w \pmod{q}$$

$$v = (g^{u_1} y^{u_2} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

Accept iff  $v = r$