Admin:

Today:

Readings:


DDH $\Rightarrow$ El Gamal is semantically secure

Cramer Shoup is IND-CCA2 secure

RSA

RSA + OAEP is IND-CCA2 secure

Other aspects of RSA security

Katz (2nd ed.) Chapters 8, 11

Paar: Chapters 6, 7, 8
**DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption):**

Given a group $G$ with generator $g$:
It is hard/infeasible to decide whether a given triple of elements was generated as

$$(g^a, g^b, g^c) \quad [a, b, c \text{ random}]$$

or

$$(g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) \quad [a, b \text{ random}]$$

That is, if DDH holds in a group, you can't even recognize the DH key $g^{ab}$ when it is given to you! (You can't distinguish it from a random element.)

**Theorem:** $\text{DDH} \implies \text{CDH}$

**Proof:** If $\neg \text{CDH}$, then $\neg \text{DDH}$ (contra-positive).

If you can compute $g^{ab}$ from $g^a$ and $g^b$ (i.e. $\neg \text{CDH}$), then you can decide if given third element is $g^{ab}$ (i.e. $\neg \text{DDH}$). $\blacksquare$
Theorem (Tsionis & Yung):
El Gamal is semantically secure in $G$ if and only if DDH holds in $G$.

- Semantic security may not be enough for some applications.
- El Gamal is malleable:
  Given $E(m) = (g^k, my^k)$, it is easy to produce $E(\alpha m) = (g^k, (\alpha y)^k)$ without knowing $m$.
- More generally, El Gamal is homomorphic:
  Given $c_1 \in E(m_1) = (g^{r_1}, m_1y^{r_1})$ and $c_2 \in E(m_2) = (g^{r_2}, m_2y^{r_2})$,
  one can produce $c_1 \cdot c_2 = (g^{r_1+r_2}, (m_1y^{r_1})(m_2y^{r_2})) \in E(m_1m_2)$.
- Product of ciphertexts yields an encryption of product of plaintexts.
- Special case: multiplying by $E(1) = (g^s, y^s)$ re-randomizes encryption.
• What is stronger notion of security for PK encryption? (e.g., one that excludes malleability...)

• "IND-CCA2 secure" (ACCA secure = secure under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack)

• IND-CCA secure defn we saw for symmetric enc.

• Similar to semantic security defn, except that Adv allowed access to decryption oracle, too.
  (He has PK so access to encryption oracle already there.)
  (As before, may not use oracle to decrypt challenge ciphertext during "guess" phase.)
**IND-CCA2 (ACCA) security games**

**Phase I ("Find")**:
- Examiner generates \((PK, SK)\) using Keygen\((1^\lambda)\)
- Examiner sends \(PK\) to Adversary
- Adversary computes for polynomial \((in \lambda)\) time, having access to a decryption oracle \(D(SK, \cdot)\) then outputs two messages \(m_0, m_1\) of same length, and "stole information" \(s\). \([m_0 \neq m_1, \text{ required}]\)

**Phase II ("Guess")**:
- Examiner picks \(b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\) computes \(c_0 = E(PK, m_b)\)
- Examiner sends \(c_0, s\) to Adversary
- Adversary computes for polynomial \((in \lambda)\) time, having access to a decryption oracle \(D(SK, \cdot)\) except on input \(c_0\) then outputs \(\hat{b}\) (his "guess" for \(b\)).

**Adversary wins if** \(\hat{b} = b\).

**Define PK encryption method is IND-CCA2 secure (ACCA-secure) if**

\[
\text{Prob}[\text{Adv wins}] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negligible}
\]
How to make ElGamal \textsc{IND-CCA2} secure?

- Cramer-Shoup method is such an extension of ElGamal.
- Let $G_q$ be a group of prime order $q$ (e.g., $G_q = \mathbb{Q}_p$, where $p = 2q + 1$, $p$ & $q$ prime).

\textbf{Keygen:}

\[ g_1, g_2 \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} G_q \]
\[ x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q \]
\[ c = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2} \]
\[ d = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2} \]
\[ h = g_1^z \]

\[ \text{PK} = (g_1, g_2, c, d, h) \]
\[ H = \text{hash fn mapping } G_q^3 \text{ to } \mathbb{Z}_q \]
\[ \text{SK} = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z) \]
\[ \text{Enc}(m) \quad \text{[where } m \in \mathbb{G}_q \text{]} : \]

\[ \begin{align*}
  r & \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\
  u_1 & = g_1^r \\
  u_2 & = g_2^r \\
  e & = h_1^r m \\
  \alpha & = H(u_1, u_2, e) \\
  v & = c^r d^r \alpha \\
  \text{ciphertext} & = (u_1, u_2, e, v)
\end{align*} \]

\[ \text{Decrypt} \ (u_1, u_2, e; v): \]

\[ \alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e) \]

Check: \[ u_1^{x_1 + y_1 \alpha} u_2^{x_2 + y_2 \alpha} \overset{?}{=} v \]

If not equal, reject.

Else output \[ m = e / u_1^{x_2} \]

Note: \[ u_1^{x_1} u_2^{x_2} = g_1^{r x_1} g_2^{r x_2} = c^r \]

\[ u_1^{x_1} u_2^{x_2} = d^r \]

\[ u_1^{x_2} = g_1^{r x_2} = h^r \]
Theorem: Cramer–Shoup is IND-CCA2 secure (i.e. secure against adaptive chosen ciphertexts) if

1. DDH holds in $G_q$
2. $H$ satisfies a certain condition (a "target collision resistance")

Thus, our strongest notion of security for PK encryption is in fact achievable, albeit at some cost in terms of speed & complexity.
Diffie-Hellman model of PK encryption:

- \( \text{Keygen}(1^k) \rightarrow (PK, SK, M, C) \)
  
  (public key, secret key, message space, ciphertext space)

  Here \( |M| = |C| \).

- \( E(PK, \cdot) \) is an efficiently computable
  
  one-to-one (deterministic) map from \( M \) to \( C \)

  \( C = E(PK, m) \) is (unique) ciphertext for \( m \)

- \( D(SK, \cdot) \) is efficiently computable inverse:

  \( D(SK, c) = D(SK, E(PK, m)) = m \quad (\forall m \in M) \)

- It is hard/infeasible to decrypt with knowledge of \( PK \) but without knowledge of \( SK \).

  \( SK \) represents "trapdoor" information that enables inversion of the (otherwise one-way)

  function \( E(PK, \cdot) \).
RSA PK encryption (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 1977)

**Keygen:**

Find two large primes $p, q$ (e.g., $\lambda = 1024$ bits each)

$$n = p \cdot q$$

$$\varphi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*| = (p-1)(q-1)$$

$$e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)}^*$$ \[i.e. \gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1\]

$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$ \[e.g. Euclid’s extended alg\]

$PK = (n, e)$

$SK = (d, p, q)$

$M = C = \mathbb{Z}_n$

**Encrypt:**

Given $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $PK = (n, e)$:

$$c = E(PK, m) = m^e \pmod{n}$$

**Decryption:**

Given $c \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $SK = (d, p, q)$:

$$m = D(SK, c) = c^d \pmod{n}$$

(Where $n = p \cdot q$)

**Note:**

$p$ 
$q$ should be large randomly chosen primes, as security of RSA depends upon inability of adversary to factor $n$ (from $PK$) into $p, q$. 
Correctness of RSA:

Lemma: (Chinese remainder theorem or CRT)

Let $n = pq$ where $p, q$ are distinct primes.

Then $(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n)$

$$x = y \pmod{n} \iff x = y \pmod{p} \land x = y \pmod{q}$$

Thus it suffices to prove RSA correct mod $p$; the proof mod $q$ is the same, and CRT then implies correctness mod $n$.

Given $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ \quad \left[ d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)} \right]$

so $e \cdot d = 1 + t \cdot (p-1)(q-1)$ for some $t$

and $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{(p-1)}$ \quad \left[ d = e^{-1} \pmod{p-1} \right]$

Correctness of RSA means

$$(m^e)^d = m \pmod{n} \quad \text{for all } m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$$

By CRT we only need to prove

$$(m^e)^d = m \pmod{p} \quad \text{for all } m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$
We consider two cases:

**Case 1:** \( m = 0 \pmod{p} \)

- Trivial: \( 0^e d = 0 \pmod{p} \)

**Case 2:** \( m \neq 0 \pmod{p} \)

- i.e. \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \)
- so \( m^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p} \) **[Fermat]**

Then \( m^e d = m^{1+u(p-1)} \pmod{p} \)

where \( u = t \cdot (q-1) \)

\( m^e d = m \cdot (m^{p-1})^u \pmod{p} \)

\( = m \cdot 1^u \)

\( = m \)

\( \therefore m^e d = m \pmod{p} \) for all \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \)

& \( m^e d = m \pmod{q} \) for all \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) (similarly)

and \( m^e d = m \pmod{n} \) for all \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) (by CRT)

Thus \( (\forall m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*) D(SK, E(PK, m)) = m \)  \( \blacksquare \)
Security of RSA

Factoring attacks:
If any adversary can factor n, then the adversary can compute \( \phi(n) \), and thus compute \( d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)} \).

How hard is factoring?

- Time \( \exp \left( c \cdot \left( \ln n \right)^{1/3} \left( \ln \ln n \right)^{2/3} \right) \)
- RSA keys of length 768 factored (2009); can expect RSA key of length 1024 bits to be factored in the "near future".
- RSA keys of length 2048 secure for a very long time, unless there are algorithmic breakthroughs on problem of factoring.

Key insight:
- Size of group \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) is unknown
- Adversary:
  - Knowing \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) ← Knowing p, q
Is (base) RSA semantically secure?

No. (It’s not even randomized...)

So, not IND-CCA2 secure either...

How to make RSA IND-CCA2 secure?

DAEP = "Optimal asymmetric encryption padding" [BR94]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Let message } m \text{ be } t \text{ bits in length.} \\
\text{Add } k_0 \text{ bits of randomness } 1r I = k_0 \\
\text{Add } k_1 \text{ bits of 0's } 0^{k_1} \text{ (to check)}
\end{align*}
\]

Assume \( G : \{0,1\}^{k_0} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t+k_1} \)

\( H : \{0,1\}^{t+k_1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{k_0} \)

\( G, H \) "random oracles"

[Compare to UFE of Desai for symmetric encryption]
**OAEP Encryption**

\[ m \rightarrow O^{k_1} \rightarrow t+k_1 \rightarrow + \rightarrow G \rightarrow H \rightarrow + \rightarrow k_0 \rightarrow k_0 \rightarrow t+k_0+k_1 \rightarrow x \rightarrow RSA \rightarrow x^e (mod n) \]

On decryption:
- invert RSA
- invert OAEP
- reject if \( O^{k_1} \) not present
- else output \( m \)
**Theorem:** RSA with OAEP is IND-CCA2 secure, assuming ROM for G & H, and assuming RSA hard to invert on random inputs.

[Bug in original proof, but OK with very slightly modified assumptions (or OAEP+)]

OAEP used in practice

(But in practice we don’t really have random oracles!)
Other aspects of RSA security:

[ref Boneh paper: 20 years of attacks on RSA]

Weak keys: small d is insecure

\( d < n^{1/4} \) allows adversary to factor n

Implementation issues:

- Power analysis \( \Rightarrow \) side channel attacks
- Timing attacks
- Fault injection (introduce power supply glitch)

(esp. if device is using CRT)

Quantum computing

Peter Shor (MIT) has shown that factoring in polynomial time is possible on a "quantum computer"