SPRITZ—A SPONGY RC4-LIKE STREAM CIPHER AND HASH FUNCTION

Ronald L. Rivest\textsuperscript{1}  Jacob C. N. Schuldt\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Vannevar Bush Professor of EECS
MIT CSAIL
Cambridge, MA 02139
rivest@mit.edu

\textsuperscript{2}Research Institute for Secure Systems
AIST, Japan
jacob.schuldt@aist.go.jp

6.857 – 2015-03-09
Summary

- We present a new stream cipher “Spritz” (generating a pseudo-random stream of bytes to be combined with plaintext to produce ciphertext) based on the architectural principles pioneered in RC4.

- An interesting aspect of the design process is that it involved considerable *automated computer search* for the best design.

- We present details of our security analysis, showing that Spritz looks “much more random” than the original RC4 design.

- The new design also has increased flexibility, allowing it to be used as cryptographic hash function as well (mapping input strings to short “digests” or “fingerprints” that effectively uniquely identify the input).
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
RC4

▶ Widely used (50% of all TLS connections).
▶ Simple, fast.
▶ Works for any set of $N$ “bytes”: $Z_N = \{0, 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$. (All math is mod $N$.) Default is $N = 256$.
▶ State consists of:
  ▶ two mod-$N$ “pointers” $i$ and $j$
  ▶ a permutation $S$ of $Z_N$
▶ Key setup algorithm (KSA) initializes $S$ from secret key $K$
▶ Pseudo-random generator (PRG) updates state and outputs pseudo-random byte; typically used as pseudo-one-time pad.


RC4-PRG

RC4-PRG()

1  \( i = i + 1 \)  // update state
2  \( j = j + S[i] \)
3  \( \text{SWAP}(S[i], S[j]) \)
4  \( z = S[S[i] + S[j]] \)  // generate output
5  \text{return } z

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
0 & 1 & i & j & S[i]+S[j] & N-1 \\
S & \cdots & \cdots & S[i] & \cdots & \cdots & z & \cdots & \cdots
\end{array}
\]
RC4-KSA

- input key $K$ is a sequence of $L$ bytes (mod $N$ values)

RC4-KSA($K$)

1. $S[0..N-1] = [0..N-1]$
2. $j = 0$
3. for $i = 0$ to $N-1$
   - $j = j + S[i] + K[i \mod L]$
   - SWAP($S[i], S[j]$)
4. $i = j = 0$

- Common criticism is that loop of lines 3–5 is executed too few times; some recommend executing it $2N-4N$ times or more, or ignoring first $2N-4N$ outputs.
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
RC4 attacks

RC4 has numerous vulnerabilities and “soft spots” [see paper for citations]:

- Key-dependent biases of initial output
- Key collisions (producing same internal state)
- Key recovery possible from known internal state
- Related-key attacks (WEP)
- State recovery from known output (feasible?)
- Output biases; distinguishers
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
We started design after CRYPTO 2013. (Really after AlFarden, ..., and Schuldt. USENIX 2013)

Design principles:

- Drop-in replacement for RC4
- Retain “RC4 style” (e.g. state is a few registers plus a permutation $S$ of $\{0, 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$)
- Minimize statistical vulnerabilities
- Redo key-setup entirely
- Expand API to have “spongy” interface: can interleave “absorbing” input and “squeezing” out pseudo-random bytes.
Automatically examined many thousands of candidates

Expressions generated and represented by postfix expressions: $i k j S++$ means $i + k + S[j]$

Filtered by:

- **syntactic criterion** (e.g. invertible expressions containing $S$ but no $SS$),
- **cryptographic criteria** (e.g. can not swap two values in $S$ and leave evolution of $j$ and $k$ unaffected), and
- **statistical criteria** (very heavy testing of candidates for smaller values of $N$. Approximately 12 “hyperthreaded core-years” of CPU time used. About $2^{53}$ Spritz outputs tested.)
Winner is #4933

- $iw^+, \ kjis+S+, \ ikjS++, \ jikz+S+S+S$

RC4-PRG()

1. $i = i + 1$
2. $j = j + S[i]$
3. SWAP($S[i], S[j]$)
4. $z = S[S[i] + S[j]]$
5. return $z$

SPRITZ-PRG()

1. $i = i + w$
2. $j = k + S[j + S[i]]$
3. $k = i + k + S[j]$
4. SWAP($S[i], S[j]$)
5. $z = S[j + S[i + S[z + k]]]$
6. return $z$

- About 50% longer
- Uses new register $k$ as well RC4 registers $i, j$; output register $z$ also used in feedback. Register $w$ always relatively prime to $N$. 
Start **SPRITZ** with **INITIALIZESTATE**

- State variable $S$ initialized to identity permutation
- “Pointer” variables $i$, $j$, $k$, initialized to 0.
- “Last output” variable $z$ initialized to 0
- “Number of nibbles absorbed” variable $a$ set to 0
- “Step size” variable $w$ initialized to 1

**INITIALIZESTATE**($N$)

1. $S[0..N-1] = [0..N-1]$
2. $i = j = k = z = a = 0$
3. $w = 1$
SQUEEZE to output $r$-byte array

SQUEEZE($r$)
1  if $a > 0$                      // last operation was ABSORB
2     SHUFFLE()
3  $P = $ new array of size $r$
4  for $v = 0$ to $r - 1$
5     $P[v] = $ SPRITZ-PRG()
6  return $P$
Encryption

\texttt{ENCRYPT}(K, M)

1 \quad \texttt{KEYSETUP}(K)
2 \quad C = M + \texttt{SQUEEZE}(M.\text{length})
3 \quad \textbf{return } C

\texttt{KEYSETUP}(K)

1 \quad \texttt{INITIALIZESTATE}()
2 \quad \texttt{ABSORB}(K)
Spritz-KSA

- **ABSORB** takes an arbitrary sequence $K$ of bytes as input.
- Absorbs each byte by absorbing its two four-bit “nibbles”.
- After each 512 bits of input, or when output is desired, **SHUFFLE** procedure called to “stir the pot” (WHIP) and to “provide forward security (CRUSH).
- Variable $a$ is number of nibbles absorbed since last **SHUFFLE**
**SHUFFLE**

- SHUFFLE effects a “random” one-way transformation on the current state.

```plaintext
SHUFFLE()
1  WHIP(2N)
2  CRUSH()
3  WHIP(2N)
4  CRUSH()
5  WHIP(2N)
6  a = 0
```
Purpose of \textsc{WHIP}(r) is to “stir the pot” vigorously, by generating and ignoring $r$ bytes of output, then increasing $w$ by 2 (so $w$ remains odd and relatively prime to 256.)

\textsc{WHIP}(r)

1 \hspace{1em} \textbf{for} \hspace{0.5em} v = 0 \hspace{0.5em} \textbf{to} \hspace{0.5em} r - 1
2 \hspace{1em} \textsc{SPRITZ-PRG}() \hspace{2em} // \text{ output ignored}
3 \hspace{1em} w = w + 2

(If $N$ is not a power of 2, \textsc{WHIP} increases $w$ to the next value that is relatively prime to $N$.)
Crush for forward security

The elements of $S$ are considered as $N/2$ pairs; each is sorted into increasing order. The input is at the top; the output at the bottom. Horizontal lines represent two-element sorting operations. Crush provides “forward security” for Shuffle.
Key-Setup (or general input) with \textsc{Absorb}

\textsc{Absorb}(K)
1 \quad \textbf{for} \ v = 0 \ \textbf{to} \ K.length - 1
2 \quad \textsc{AbsorbByte}(K[v])

\textsc{AbsorbByte}(b)
1 \quad \textsc{AbsorbNibble}(\text{low}(b))
2 \quad \textsc{AbsorbNibble}(\text{high}(b))

\textsc{AbsorbNibble}(x)
1 \quad \textbf{if} \ a = \lfloor N/2 \rfloor
2 \quad \textsc{Shuffle}()
3 \quad \textsc{Swap}(S[a], S[\lfloor N/2 \rfloor + x])
4 \quad a = a + 1
Nibble sequence 1,2,1,0 has just been absorbed. When the $a$-th nibble $x$ is absorbed, $S[a]$ is exchanged with $S[N/2 + x]$; note that $0 \leq x < D$, where $D = \sqrt{N}$. ABSORB never touches the last $N/2 - D$ elements of $S$, greatly limiting how adversarial input can affect $S$. 
SPRITZ is spongy!

- SPRITZ is also a (modified) sponge function, and usable as a hash function:

1. **INITIALIZE STATE**(N)
2. **ABSORB**("abc") – ACCEPT INPUT PIECEMEAL.
3. **ABSORB**("def")
4. **SQUEEZE**(32) – OUTPUT 32 BYTE HASH.
5. **ABSORB**("ghi") – KEEP GOING...
6. **SQUEEZE**(1000)

- Large state space (like KECCAK), but also has built-in protection against inference of key from knowledge of internal state (which KECCAK does not).
- (But very much slower than Keccak...)
AbsorbStop rather than padding

- AbsorbStop absorbs an “out-of-alphabet” symbol; makes for easier interfaces than padding rules.
- All AbsorbStop does is increase \(a\) (the number of absorbed nibbles) by one, without actually absorbing a nibble.

AbsorbStop()

1. if \(a = \lfloor N/2 \rfloor\)
2. shuffle()
3. \(a = a + 1\)
Spritz as a hash function

- Note that we include output length $r$ in the hash input, so $r$-byte hash outputs are not just a prefix of $r'$-byte hash outputs for $r < r'$; these act as distinct hash functions.

**HASH($M, r$)**

1. `INITIALIZE STATE()`
2. `ABSORB($M$); ABSORBSTOP()`
3. `ABSORB($r$)`
4. `return SQUEEZE($r$)`
MAC example with $r$-byte output.

**MAC**($K, M, r$)
1. $\text{INITIALIZE\:STATE()}$
2. $\text{ABSORB}(K); \text{ABSORB\:STOP}()$
3. $\text{ABSORB}(M); \text{ABSORB\:STOP}()$
4. $\text{ABSORB}(r)$
5. $\text{return SQUEEZE}(r)$
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
Statistical testing

- Primary tool: chi-square testing for uniformity.
- Typical test: chi-square for uniformity of triple \((i, z1, z)\) (aka “iz1z”) where zs is z delayed s steps. Table has \(N^3\) entries for counts.
- Tests run include \(\text{j} \text{s} \text{j}, \text{i} \text{k} \text{s} \text{k}, \text{i} \text{z} \text{s} \text{z}, \text{i} \text{j} \text{s} \text{z}, \text{a} \text{n} \text{d} \text{i} \text{k} \text{s} \text{z}\) for \(s\) up to \(N\).
- Tested \(N = 16\): no biases for \(2^{32}\) outputs; for \(2^{36}\) outputs biases detected (strongest iz3z).
- Chi-square biases modelled as \(cN^{-d}\); good model for all RC4-like designs; can fit curves to estimate \(c\) and \(d\) as function of \(N\).
- Measured biases for \(N = 16, 24, 32\), extrapolate to \(N = 64, 128, 256\).
Biases measured and extrapolated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$\log_2(#\text{keystream bytes})$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RC4 ($i_z1z$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>19.5799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>22.8294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>25.1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>30.6900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>36.2450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>41.8000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expected number of outputs required for RC4 and Spritz to reach a distribution with a chi-square deviating by one standard deviation from the expected chi-square statistic of a uniform distribution, for the best distinguisher in each case.
Graph

Spritz

RC4

$\log_2$ of outputs required versus $N$
Much better statistics!

- Spritz statistical biases are *much* fainter than for RC4.
- For $N = 256$:
  - Can distinguish RC4-256 from random with only $2^{41}$ samples.
  - Our tests suggest that $2^{81}$ samples are required to distinguish SPRITZ-256 from random.
Other security properties

Design of Spritz should also make the following hard:
- inferring state from observed output
- inferring key from known state
- related-key attacks
- finding collision for Spritz as hash function
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
Performance

- Squeeze output at 94MB/sec (24 cycles/byte) (RC4 is 293MB/sec).
- Absorb data at 5MB/sec (408 cycles/byte) (Keccak is 11 cycles/byte)

The virtues of Spritz are more its simplicity of implementation, flexibility, and secure conservative design than its speed.
Outline

RC4

RC4 attacks

Spritz

Security Analysis of Spritz

Performance

Conclusion
Conclusion

SPRITZ is a spongy stream cipher in the style of RC4; it shows excellent statistical properties and great flexibility for applications.
Our paper on SPRITZ is here:

people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RS14

More security review needed; comments and analysis appreciated!

Thank you!